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Background: Rising food bank usage in the UK suggests a growing 
prevalence of food insecurity. However, a formalised, representative 
measure of food insecurity was not collected in the UK until 2019, over 
a decade after the initial proliferation of food bank demand. In the 
absence of a direct measure of food insecurity, this article identifies 
and summarises longitudinal proxy indicators of UK food insecurity to 
gain insight into the growth of insecure access to food in the 21st 
century. 
Methods: A rapid evidence synthesis of academic and grey literature 
(2005–present) identified candidate proxy longitudinal markers of 
food insecurity. These were assessed to gain insight into the 
prevalence of, or conditions associated with, food insecurity. 
Results: Food bank data clearly demonstrates increased food 
insecurity. However, this data reflects an unrepresentative, fractional 
proportion of the food insecure population without accounting for 
mild/moderate insecurity, or those in need not accessing provision. 
Economic indicators demonstrate that a period of poor overall UK 
growth since 2005 has disproportionately impacted the poorest 
households, likely increasing vulnerability and incidence of food 
insecurity. This vulnerability has been exacerbated by welfare reform 
for some households. The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically 
intensified vulnerabilities and food insecurity. Diet-related health 
outcomes suggest a reduction in diet quantity/quality. The causes of 
diet-related disease are complex and diverse; however, evidence of 
socio-economic inequalities in their incidence suggests poverty, and 
by extension, food insecurity, as key determinants. 
Conclusion: Proxy measures of food insecurity suggest a significant 
increase since 2005, particularly for severe food insecurity. Proxy 
measures are inadequate to robustly assess the prevalence of food 
insecurity in the UK. Failure to collect standardised, representative 
data at the point at which food bank usage increased significantly 
impairs attempts to determine the full prevalence of food insecurity, 
understand the causes, and identify those most at risk.
Open Peer Review
Reviewer Status  AWAITING PEER REVIEW
Any reports and responses or comments on the 
article can be found at the end of the article.
Emerald Open Research
 
Page 1 of 34
Emerald Open Research 2021, 3:16 Last updated: 09 AUG 2021
Corresponding authors: Neil Bernard Boyle (n.b.boyle@leeds.ac.uk), Maddy Power (madeleine.power@york.ac.uk)
Author roles: Boyle NB: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Investigation, Methodology, Project Administration, Writing – Original Draft 
Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; Power M: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Investigation, Methodology, Project Administration, 
Writing – Original Draft Preparation, Writing – Review & Editing
Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Grant information: The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work.
Copyright: © 2021 Boyle NB and Power M. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited.
How to cite this article: Boyle NB and Power M. Proxy longitudinal indicators of household food insecurity in the UK [version 1; 
peer review: awaiting peer review] Emerald Open Research 2021, 3:16 https://doi.org/10.35241/emeraldopenres.14311.1
First published: 09 Aug 2021, 3:16 https://doi.org/10.35241/emeraldopenres.14311.1 
Keywords 
Food insecurity, food banks, poverty, malnutrition, longitudinal data
 
This article is included in the Sustainable Food 
Systems gateway.
 




Page 2 of 34
Emerald Open Research 2021, 3:16 Last updated: 09 AUG 2021
Introduction
‘Food security’ means having access at all times to enough food 
that is both sufficiently varied and culturally appropriate to sus-
tain an active and healthy life1. The Family Resource Survey 
(FRS) for the financial year 2019 to 2020 (data released 2021) 
identified 8% of UK households to be food insecure, with low 
household food insecurity (4%) or very low household food 
security (4%). A further 6% of the population lived in house-
holds that were marginally food secure meaning that 14% 
of the UK population were food insecure or marginally 
food insecure before the onset of COVID-192. Food insecu-
rity was particularly high among single parent households 
(29%), households in receipt of Universal Credit (UC; 43%), 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British households (19%), and 
households with one or more disabled adults (19%).
The FRS was the first large representative national survey to 
include questions on food insecurity providing much needed 
information in a field with previously limited robust data on 
UK household food insecurity, and no nationally representa-
tive longitudinal data. The exception to this is the Food and 
You Survey. From 2016, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
included the Adult Food Security Module in the bi-annual 
Food and You Survey. The efficacy of the survey, which covers 
adults living in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, is lim-
ited by its relatively small sample size (a total of 9,319 adults 
from 6,408 households, compared to 19,213 households in the 
2019/20 FRS). The most recent Food and You Survey (Food 
and You 2 - wave 1), the fieldwork for which was conducted 
during the COVID-19 pandemic (29 July - 6 October 2020), 
identified 16% of respondents to be food insecure (9% low, 7% 
very low)3. This proportion was a marked increase on previous 
surveys: survey Waves 4 and 5 (Food and You 1) identified 
10% of households in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to 
be food insecure, suggesting that COVID-19 has led to sharp 
increases in household food insecurity (see also 4).
There has been a marked rise in the use of food banks since 
the 2007–08 global financial crisis suggesting rising food 
insecurity over the past decade5. This is corroborated by a lim-
ited number of studies, including Davis and Geiger’s longitu-
dinal analysis of the European Quality of Life Survey, which 
assess food insecurity utilising the single question ‘could your 
household afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish every sec-
ond day if you wanted it?’6 and Loopstra, Reeves and Tarasuk’s 
comparison of food insecurity in the 2016 Wave 4 Food and 
You Survey with the 2004 Low Income Diet and Nutrition 
Survey7. Controlling for socioeconomic variables, Loopstra 
et al. found that the probability of low-income adults being 
food insecure rose from 27.7% (95% CI 24.8% to 30.6 %) in 
2004 to 45.8% (95% CI 41.6% to 49.9%) in 2016.
Analysis of the FSA data by Loopstra, Reeves and Tarasuk sug-
gests that, while food insecurity affects many economically 
deprived groups in the UK, unemployment, disability, low income 
and receipt of social security are characteristics specifically 
associated with severe food insecurity - findings corroborated 
by the 2019–2020 FRS data2. Indeed, it is well-established that 
the primary cause of food insecurity is low income and pov-
erty, itself often attributable to social security receipt8. However 
poverty is not necessarily synonymous with food insecurity – 
for example, in the United States, a high proportion of house-
holds reporting food security are poor, and a portion of 
households with incomes above the poverty line are food 
insecure9.
The impacts of food insecurity on health, well-being and diet 
among adults are manifold and severe. Food insecurity is a 
cause and consequence of poor mental and physical health10–13, 
and associated with overweight, obesity14 and diet quality. Food 
insecurity also has considerable health and developmental 
implications for children, including lower vegetable intake and 
higher added sugar intake15,16 and poorer academic performance17.
In the light of the absence of longitudinal data on household 
food insecurity in the UK and the well-evidenced relationship 
between food insecurity and multiple markers of socioeconomic 
status, including low income7, receipt means-tested benefits18 
and living in council housing/social housing8, we identify 
proxy indicators for food insecurity and summarise trends in 
these indicators since 2005 – a date which marks the start of 
the increase in Trussell Trust food bank usage in the UK. This 
article aims to provide insight into changes in poverty and 
nutritional deficiencies since 2005 as an indication of possible 
trends in food insecurity in the twenty-first century. 
The study had two main aims:
1.  To conduct a rapid evidence review to identify can-
didate proxy indicators of household food insecurity 
in the UK.
2.  To collate and present evidence from the identified 
indicators in an attempt to ascertain if it is possible to 
appraise the prevalence of household food insecurity 
in the UK over the last 15 years.
Methods
The absence of a direct measure of UK food insecurity neces-
sitates the use of proxy or ancillary markers that may give 
an approximate indication of the prevalence of food insecurity 
or, more accurately, the prevalence of the conditions that may 
be associated with or increase the likelihood of food insecurity. 
To identify potential markers that could be used to approxi-
mate the level or prevalence of historical food insecurity in the 
UK, we conducted a rapid evidence review of the existing 
literature. A systematic search of peer-reviewed articles and 
grey resources was undertaken by the authors. The criteria 
for inclusion were as follows: a) conditions of interest: any 
published works or grey literature that report direct or proxy 
indicators of food insecurity in the UK published between 
January 2005 and the present day; b) outcomes of interest: any 
indicator that directly measures food insecurity or any proxy 
indicator that is associated with food insecurity or the condi-
tions which increase the likelihood of food insecurity; c) setting: 
United Kingdom only; d) study designs: all study designs; 
e) article published in the English language; and f) full text 
available.
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Searches were conducted by both authors between March 2020 
and May 2020. Full text database searches (inclusive of records 
2005–2020) of Web of Science, PsycINFO, and EMBASE 
were conducted in April 2020. The following search terms were 
used: ‘food insecurity AND indicator*’; ‘food poverty AND 
indicator*’; ‘food poverty AND Measur*’; ‘Food insecurity 
AND Measur*’. Additional filters of ‘UK’, ‘United Kingdom’, 
England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and NI were applied 
to the search findings. Results from the first 50 pages of a 
GoogleScholar ‘anywhere in text’ search for ‘food insecurity 
indicator UK’ were also reviewed. The authors’ own experience 
in the area of food insecurity and consultation with contacts 
working in food insecurity sector further informed the selec-
tion of markers to include. Government statistics and reports 
were also searched to identify data relevant to the study aims to 
be included in the review.
The initial database searches returned a total of 5,164 publica-
tions. This was reduced to 69 publications after geographical 
filters were applied. Publication titles were reviewed to 
remove patently irrelevant and duplicate publications, leaving 
a total of 39 articles selected for abstract review. The full text 
versions of 36 publications were retrieved and examined. 
Articles were reviewed by the authors and those that did not 
meet the criteria were excluded by consensus. Based on the arti-
cles, grey literature and governmental data sources retrieved 
through the search, potential indicators were extracted from 
source. The indicators were listed with methods to extract 
data for each indicator (e.g. ONS), and the source from which 
the indicator was taken (e.g. published work or charity report). 
Both reviewers agreed on the most relevant indicators of 
food insecurity based on the relevance of the indicator and 
availability of longitudinal data.
Results
The multiple proxy indicators for food insecurity we identi-
fied included: use of food banks; economic markers showing 
general economic trends; household income; measures of 
income-related poverty; changes in social security; benefit 
sanctions and conditionality; housing costs; the costs of food; 
and trends in malnutrition and dietary markers. The following 
sections discuss each of these proxy indicators in turn, explain-
ing the rationale for their inclusion and setting out longitudinal 
data on trends.
Food banks
In the absence of any direct measure of food insecurity in the 
UK there has been reliance on estimates of food bank usage, 
predominantly Trussell Trust food banks, to monitor the chang-
ing prevalence of food insecurity over time. The Trussell Trust 
has published data on the growth of their network and scale 
of provision since 200519 (see Figure 1).
The number of Trussell Trust food banks, as well as the number 
of food parcels distributed, increased significantly from 
2011/2012. These increases are echoed in data collated by 
independent food aid providers20. In early 2021, there were 
an estimated 1,300 Trussell Trust and over 1052 independent 
food banks operating in the UK. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has further accelerated the number of food aid providers and 
distribution of food parcels. By the end of April 2020, the 
Trussell Trust reported an 89% increase in food parcel distribu-
tion compared to April 201921; the Independent Food Aid Net-
work (IFAN) reported an increase of emergency food parcel 
distribution of 175% between the same comparison periods21.
These data certainly suggest a growth in food insecurity 
since 2005. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
using food bank data to estimate objective levels of food 
insecurity is problematic. The number of operating food banks 
is a poor objective indicator of food insecurity since the crea-
tion of a food bank is reliant on and driven by action of local 
community partners. Whilst this is likely driven by local 
need, there will be incidences where there is a local need for 
provision but a lack of local networks to establish a food 
bank. Further, the number of food parcels distributed has until 
Figure 1. A. Number of food banks in the Trussell Trust network 2005/06 – 2019/20. B. Number of Trussell Trust food parcel distributed in 
the UK 2005/06 – 2020/21. Data from Trussell Trust data: http://www.trusselltrust.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/06/BIGGEST-EVER-
INCREASE-IN-UK-FOODBANK-USE.pdf; https://www.trusselltrust.org/state-of-hunger/.
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recently been indicative of the total volume of parcels allo-
cated rather than the number of distinct individuals receiving 
food aid. The Trussell Trust started recording unique food bank 
users in April 2016, but this data offers an incomplete pic-
ture of the prevalence of food insecurity. It is often unclear how 
many distinct households are accessing food bank parcels and, 
moreover, the majority of those who are food insecure may 
not seek food aid provision. In Canada, it has been estimated 
that only 20% of food insecure individuals access food 
banks22, findings echoed by recent UK evidence23. The vast 
majority of those accessing food aid in the UK are considered 
destitute19 and likely representative of individuals facing severe 
food insecurity. Therefore food bank data can be consid-
ered to be indicative of a non-representative subset of the food 
insecure population22.
Economic markers
Macroeconomic markers are likely to blunt a measure to give 
any granular insight into the potential indicators or prevalence 
of food insecurity, since general economic trends may obscure 
the micro economic factors that may impact specific sections 
of the population. However, a wider perspective on the general 
economic landscape since 2005 serves as a useful background 
against which to discuss more detailed and specific proxy 
markers associated with food insecurity risk. Since 2005, the 
UK economy has been characterised by relatively low lev-
els of economic growth24,25. The 2007–2008 Great Recession 
(hereafter the ‘recession’) instigated a significant down-
turn in growth between the years 2008 and 2013, a period 
which witnessed a marked upsurge in food bank usage. 
Unemployment also increased significantly during the reces-
sion years (and economic fallout) of 2008–2013 (Figure 2). 
Since this period, UK employment rates have steadily grown 
to levels above those reported pre-recession.
In the following sections, we consider historical data on the abso-
lute and relative income of the UK population and how this relates 
to the cost of living and capacity to acquire food of sufficient 
quantity and quality over time. In the wake of the recession, 
the Coalition and Conservative governments instigated a long 
period of economic austerity and welfare retrenchment char-
acterised by significant public spending cuts. Therefore, it is 
essential to examine historical data in relation to public spend-
ing and benefits to illustrate the changing public spending land-
scape that may have contributed to food insecurity vulnerability. 
The identification of proxy markers of food insecurity was 
undertaken at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak before the 
profound economic and social impacts of the pandemic were 
fully appreciated. Unsurprisingly, early reports were sugges-
tive of catastrophic effects of the pandemic on the prevalence 
of food insecurity. The recession, often cited as the key cata-
lyst for the growth in food insecurity, resulted in a maximal sin-
gle quarter shrinkage in the UK economy of 2.1%. The UK 
economy shrank 3% in the first quarter of 2020 as COVID-19 
lockdown restrictions were introduced; by the second quarter 
of 2020 this shrinkage had risen to a historically unprecedented 
18.8% (see Figure 324).
Household income
The capacity to afford sufficient and appropriate food to sus-
tain an active and healthy life is intrinsically linked to house-
hold income. Figure 4 shows the median net household income 
between 2005 and 2018 for the UK population. Median income 
represents the level of household income above 50% of the 
UK population as a whole, giving an indication of average 
living standards of a population. Income is measured at the 
household level after the deduction of taxes and addition of state 
benefits and tax credits. Income is then ‘equivalised’ to res-
cale the value to account for different needs of households of 
different sizes and compositions. The median income can be 
calculated before housing costs1 (BHC) or after housing costs 
(AHC) are deducted from income.
1Housing costs are inclusive of rent (gross of housing benefit), water rates 
(including council and community charges), mortgage interest payments 
and structural insurance premiums (for owner occupiers) and ground 
rent and service charges.
Figure 2. UK Employment, unemployment and economic inactivity levels (%) Aug-Oct 2005 – Aug-Oct 2020.  Data from Office 
for National Statistics Labour Force Survey: https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/
employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/january2021.
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By historical standards, recent median income growth in the 
UK has been characterised by a prolonged period of dismal 
growth resulting in over a decade of unprecedented limited 
improvement in average living standards26. An average year on 
year increase of just 0.3% in income BHC was recorded between 
2008–2018; the slowest growth over any 10 year period since 
the 1970s26. After a slump during the recession, some growth 
in median income was evident between 2015–2017. How-
ever, the impact of Brexit on the rate of inflation and deprecia-
tion of the Sterling contributed to the stalling of income growth 
from 2017 onwards. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, growth 
was forecast to slow even further as the full economic effects 
of the UK leaving the EU unfurled. The impact of COVID-19 
on average income has yet to be fully appreciated; however, 
prior to lockdown restrictions, UK median BHC income had not 
increased since 2015 and had grown only 4% compared to aver-
age income on the eve of the recession in 2008. It is highly 
likely the ongoing impact of COVID-19 will further depress the 
median UK income for some time.
Demographic inequality in household income
It is important to further interrogate data on median average 
income by demographic variables to ascertain if specific sections 
of the UK population have experienced comparable income 
profiles over time. Figure 4 also shows the median income for 
those aged below and above 60 years. Those over 60 years have 
experienced a more consistently rising median income since 
2005, both BHC and AHC. The relative difference in median 
income between the age groups largely disappears AHC, which 
reflects a higher percentage of those over 60 owning their 
own homes. In 2018 the median income in the over 60’s was 
12% higher than prior to the recession in 2007; growth was 3% 
during the same period for those below 60 years26. However, 
growth has stalled for all age groups since 2017. This age dis-
parity in average income growth corresponds to demographic 
food bank usage data that shows the greatest risk of being 
referred to food banks in those aged 25–54, with those of pension 
age (65+ years) comprising a minority of referrals (2%)19. 
This is further supported by data from the FRS food insecurity 
module that reported 3% of 64–74 year olds and 1% of those 
74 years and above lived in food insecure households in 
2019–20; compared to a range of 8–15% of those in younger 
age groups2. However, the reported weekly equivalised house-
hold income AHC of Trussell Trust food bank users in 2018 
was in the region of £5019. It is, thus, evident, that there is 
considerable variability in income around the median household 
Figure 3. UK GDP growth, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2005 until Quarter 3 (July to September) 2020. Data from: Office for National 
Statistics. https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyq/qna.
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income. Examination of incomes along the distribution will 
provide a clearer indication of the relative risk of having 
insufficient income to afford an adequate diet.
Economic inequality in household income growth
Figure 5 shows the real income growth in percentile of house-
hold income BHC and AHC. Analysis by Bourquin et al.26 
found that BHC incomes in 2018 were comparable to those 
in 2015 for the 50th, 25th and 75th percentiles. At the lower end 
of the distribution, a markedly slower growth in income is 
shown in the 10th percentile of incomes with a lack of overall 
growth since 2013. This compares to a 6% growth in income in 
the 90th percentile since 2013. The fall in income growth since 
2016 in the 10th percentile is even more pronounced after 
housing costs have been deducted (see Figure 5). Overall, the 
lowest income households have seen little change in living 
standards since 2013 as a result of reduced income levels since 
2016, essentially eradicating any income gains between 2013 
and 2020.
To understand the comparative lack of income growth since 
2013 in the lowest income households Bourquin et al. identi-
fied the different sources from which households across the BHC 
income distribution typically derived income. Findings sug-
gest income gains made by low-income households as a result 
of rising employment during 2013–2016 were largely offset 
by a 7% fall in the real value of working-age benefits and tax 
credits. This was further compounded by the stagnation in 
income growth across the UK in 2016 as a result of rises in 
inflation26. Overall, it is estimated that reduced income from 
working-age benefits and tax credits since 2013 contributed 
to an 8% reduction in income in the lowest income house-
holds. This essentially mitigated the effects of increased income 
from rising employment (estimated to be a 9% net increase in 
income during this period26).
Measures of income-related poverty
Measures of poverty are commonly based upon the determina-
tion of income available to a household. The UK government 
measures poverty in relation to median household income. 
A distinction is made between the ‘absolute’ poverty rate, 
which compares household income to a median income level 
fixed in time (a base median income year of 2010–11 is used 
for the Department of Work and Pension’s [DWP] Households 
Below Average Income [HBAI] statistics), and ‘relative’ poverty 
rate which compares household income to the median house-
hold income in the same year. A threshold of 60% below the 
comparison median household income value is adopted to 
characterise households falling into absolute and relative pov-
erty. HBAI statistics assume all individuals in the household 
benefit equally from the combined household income and this 
is net of taxes and benefits and equivalised based on household 
size and composition.
Relative poverty rates give an indication of whether the poor-
est households are keeping up with the households in the 
middle of the distribution and are considered more informa-
tive when looking at data over longer periods since the notion 
Figure 4. UK median net household income (before and after housing costs) 2005/06 – 2018/19, overall and by age group. 
Adapted with Institute for Fiscal Studies permission from Bourquin et al., 2020. Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2020. IFS: 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/R170-Living-standards-poverty-and-inequality-in-the-UK-2019-2020%20.pdf.
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of an ‘acceptable standard of living’ is likely to be relative and 
to change over time. Absolute poverty rates are considered to 
reflect the real income of the poorest households irrespec-
tive of trends across other households and are more informative 
over shorter time periods27. Both measures of poverty rate 
are calculated BHC and AHC. The DWP recommends the 
use of BHC when assessing the poverty rates for children and 
working age adults as AHC may underestimate the living 
standards of those who spend a larger proportion of their income 
on housing, either due to the unaffordability of local hous-
ing stock or the desire to attain a higher standard of living. 
However, AHC will be considered for all demographic groups 
here since poorer households tend to spend a higher propor-
tion of their income on housing28, and this disparity between 
the poorest and wealthiest households has increased over 
recent years29. BHC income is also sensitive to fluctuations in 
Housing Benefit as rent costs increase or decrease, which gives 
the false impression of a rise or fall in income without any 
change in standard of living in the household27.
Figure 6 shows the equivalised relative UK poverty (AHC) in 
the population as a whole and by demographic group between 
2005 and 2018. It is important to note there is a significant 
lag in the reporting of UK poverty data. At the time of writing, 
data is only available up to 2018. In the UK population as a 
whole, the relative poverty rate has remained stable around 22% 
since 2005. A decline in child and pensioner AHC relative pov-
erty resulted in a small drop in overall UK poverty rates between 
2007 and 2011 (22.5% to 21%). This reflects the incomes of 
poorer households increasing faster than the median household 
income after a fall in real earnings and increase in real ben-
efit receipt in the wake of the 2008 recession. As discussed 
previously, this was essentially mitigated from 2008 and 
particularly from 2010 as median incomes increased and work-
ing age benefits value decreased27,30. By 2018, relative poverty 
rates had roughly returned to levels recorded before the onset of 
the 2008 recession. However, the different demographic groups 
saw contrasting poverty rate profiles in the intervening years. 
Working-age adults without children have seen reduced poverty 
rates since 2011 (19.4% to 15.8%). A sustained increase in child 
poverty is seen from 2011, increasing from ~27% and stabil-
ising at around 30% from 2016 onwards; the most sustained 
rise in relative child poverty since early 1990. Pensioner pov-
erty has almost halved since the 1990s and showed signs of 
continued improvement during the recession, largely due to gov-
ernment policy decisions. Increases have been recorded since 
2014 – although some question if this represents a genuine 
trend31.
Children are the most likely group to experience poverty. A 
2017 analysis by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) projected 
poverty rates in pensioners and working-age adults without 
children to remain largely unchanged up to 2021. Conversely, 
childhood poverty was projected to significantly increase from 
29.7% in 2015 to 36.6% by 202127. Children are more likely 
to experience relative poverty due to poorer households with 
children tending to obtain less of their household income 
directly from earnings32. Therefore, as real earnings grow, 
those that receive more of their income from earnings – e.g. 
working-age adults without children – are more likely to see 
their incomes increase in line with real income growth. Pen-
sioners are similarly protected since the state pension and 
pension credits are ‘triple locked’ linked to the highest marker 
of income growth (average earnings, CPI inflation or 2.5%). 
Poorer households receiving more of their income from social 
security are vulnerable to fluctuations in social welfare value 
Figure 5. Real growth in percentiles of household income BHC and AHC 2007/08-2018/19. Adapted with Institute for Fiscal Studies 
permission from Bourquin et al., 2020. Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2020. IFS: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/R170-
Living-standards-poverty-and-inequality-in-the-UK-2019-2020%20.pdf.
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or changes to benefit entitlements27. For example, the intro-
duction of the ‘two-child limit’ effectively removed any tax 
or UC contribution for any third and additional children born 
on or after the 6th April 2017. This is likely to significantly 
reduce the income of poorer households and increase the 
risk of being driven into relative poverty.
Figure 7 shows the equivalised absolute UK poverty (AHC) in 
the population as a whole and by demographic group between 
2007 and 2018. A modest 2.1% fall in absolute poverty rates 
was seen between 2007–2015, largely driven by favourable 
social security policies reducing child and pensioner poverty27. 
However, the reduction in absolute poverty rates in the UK over 
recent years has been small by historical standards. Absolute 
poverty was reduced by 1.4% between 2010 – 2018. An aver-
age reduction of 5–6% has been reported in recent decades 
over the equivalent time period. There has been very little 
change in absolute poverty rates since 2016. This appears con-
tradictory since low-income households have seen a reduction in 
earnings during this period (see Figure 5). As Bourquin et al.26 
emphasise, this has not been accompanied by a subsequent 
reduction in the absolute poverty rate as falls in income during 
this period were isolated to those households below the poverty 
line. In fact, falls in incomes since 2016 were seen only in the 
10th percentile of the distribution, representing a deepening 
of poverty in those already most vulnerable to its impact.
Alternative poverty metrics are available which include 
additional social and resource-based measures, but these tend 
to be less suitable for comparing trends over longer periods of 
time. For example, low income and material deprivation measures 
combine a low income threshold (the DWP employs 70% 
below median income) with an assessment of household mate-
rial deprivation, i.e. capacity to access key goods or services. 
However, the indicators used to determine deprivation since 2005 
have varied so are not suitable for assessing changes over the 
whole time period. Recent data estimate that 11% of children 
in the UK were in low income and material deprivation in 
2018. This represents a fall against comparable data that esti-
mated a prevalence of roughly 13% between 2010–201428. This 
may be as a result of price falls in some material items relied 
on more in low-income households19. Data prior to these years 
are based on non-equivalent metrics.
Estimates of poverty are influenced by a number of potential 
confounding factors, which may serve to inflate or underestimate 
Figure 6. Relative UK poverty rate (AHC) by population and demographic group 2005/06 – 2018/19. Adapted with Institute for Fiscal 
Studies permission from Bourquin et al., 2020. Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2020. IFS: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/
R170-Living-standards-poverty-and-inequality-in-the-UK-2019-2020%20.pdf.
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the true level of poverty. Data on UK poverty are taken from 
the FRS that employs responses from ~19,000 households each 
year to estimate the distribution of income. However, it is clear 
that a level of under-reporting occurs, particularly in relation 
to the receipt of social security since there is often a disparity 
between the reported benefits received and government benefit 
expenditure28. Conversely, the use of a cross-sectional survey 
to estimate poverty levels fails to acknowledge that poverty 
is not static and would not account for those households that 
may fall in and out of poverty on multiple occasions over the 
year; therefore underestimation of poverty levels is also possi-
ble. Data on persistent levels of poverty – defined as experienc-
ing relative low income for at least 3 of the last 4 years – suggest 
13% of the UK population experienced persistent low-income 
(AHC) between 2014 – 2018; children were again the most 
affected by persistent poverty in the UK (based on Understanding 
Society survey28).
In-work poverty
Having a job doesn’t necessarily secure an adequate standard of 
living or protect households from poverty and food insecurity. 
Despite rising employment rates prior to the pandemic and the 
introduction of the National Living Wage, 58% of working 
households – households with at least one adult in paid employ-
ment – were living below the UK relative poverty line in 
2017/18; compared to 37% of working households in 1994/9529. 
This heightened proportion of in poverty working households 
is largely reflective of changes in the labour market. Reduced 
household worklessness has increased the number of typically 
low-earning households in work (e.g. lone parents) which has 
changed the composition of working households. Improvements 
in the living standards of pensioners and workless households 
has also pushed up the relative poverty line. However, a third 
of the increase in working poverty is as a result of a rise in rela-
tive poverty for working households29. This in-work poverty 
rate has increased from ~14% in 2004/5 to 18.2% in 2018/19, an 
increase of over 30%29. Children may be particularly impacted 
by rising in-work poverty trends with an estimated seven 
in ten children in poverty living in a working household in 
2019/2033. Analysis by Bourquin et al.29 suggests that increased 
in-work poverty was a result of: (i) increased disparity in pro-
portional household earnings growth (pre-tax total household 
Figure 7. Absolute UK poverty rate (AHC) by population and demographic groups 2007/08 –2018/19. Adapted with Institute for 
Fiscal Studies permission from Bourquin et al., 2020. Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2020. IFS: https://www.ifs.org.uk/
uploads/R170-Living-standards-poverty-and-inequality-in-the-UK-2019-2020%20.pdf.
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income) between low and higher income households, and 
(ii) a disproportionate rise in housing costs for low vs higher 
income households.
A rising number of those in employment find themselves in 
jobs with little security. The emergence in the labour market of 
the ‘precariat’ – those employed in temporary and zero-hour 
contracts – has been a subject of much debate since such non-
standard forms2 of working expanded. Figure 8 shows the 
proportion of UK adults employed on zero-hour contracts 
between 2005 and 2020. Whilst the number of zero-hour con-
tracts have been rising since 2005, a noticeable increase is 
evident after the recession from 2013. Increases in zero-hour 
contracts have been particularly concentrated in younger adults, 
constituting 8.8% of employment in 16–24 year olds in 201934. 
The UK government has suggested zero-contracts represent part 
of a growing employment flexibility in the UK labour market35. 
However, as zero-hour jobs are concentrated in low-paid low-skill 
jobs and often characterised by inconsistent, unguaranteed 
hours, they are inevitably associated with precarious income. 
Table 1 shows the proportion of zero-hour contract workers 
satisfied with the level of employment they could access in 
2020. Whilst there is support for the government’s assertion 
that zero-hour contracts give many individuals a desired flex-
ibility in working pattern (61% indicating they did not want more 
hours), 29% reported underemployment34. People in poverty 
are much more likely to be underemployed33. Further, a 2019 
review of independent food banks in England reported 62% of 
those accessing food parcels were employed on zero-hour con-
tracts. Therefore, the increase in such precarious types of 
employment over recent years has likely contributed to some 
degree to heightened vulnerability to food insecurity for some. 
Those working on zero-hour contracts also have less employ-
ment benefits such as redundancy rights and pension contribu-
tions. Precarious working is also associated with increased stress 
and greater incidence of impaired mental and physical health36. 
These additional factors may further increase vulnerability to 
poverty and food insecurity.
The economic impact of the pandemic has been largely con-
centrated in industries characterised by zero-hour working 
practices: wholesale and retail, accommodation and food serv-
ices, and health and social work services. The primary affected 
2Non-standard is defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
as any form of employment that deviates from standard employment, 
which consists of guaranteed minimum employment standards and security 
of tenure.
Figure 8. Proportionate of UK adults in employment on zero hour contracts 2005 – 2020. Data from ONS Labour 
Force Survey: https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/datasets/
emp17peopleinemploymentonzerohourscontracts.
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jobs are also low income and not suited to home working. 
Lockdown greatly increased underemployment in these sec-
tors, which is expected to translate to unemployment as gov-
ernment support schemes are withdrawn37. This is likely to 
further increase the risk of those in low-paid, non-standard 
(e.g. zero-hour contracts) employment facing increased 
vulnerability to food insecurity.
Social security
Changes to the UK social security system have clear impli-
cations for households most vulnerable to experiencing food 
insecurity since a higher proportion of income in poorer house-
holds is derived from social security. This was firmly sup-
ported by the 2019/20 FRS food insecurity module in which 
43% of households in receipt of UC reported low or very low 
food security2. A primary function of the social security system 
is to replace or supplement incomes to permit individuals and 
households to meet the fundamental costs of living if they are 
unable to adequately do so through employment. Means tested 
benefits – such as UC, Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Work-
ing Tax Credit, and Housing Benefit – are allocated based on 
relative need (e.g. size of family) to protect a basic standard of 
living for recipients. To ensure social security benefits are suf-
ficient to permit those they support to afford the costs of living, 
benefits have traditionally been reviewed on an annual basis. 
Since the 1980’s, benefit entitlements have been uprated in line 
with the relative costs of living and yearly inflation rate; from 
2005 up to 2012 this averaged approximately 2% each year33. In 
the wake of the recession, the UK Conservative-led Coali-
tion and subsequent Conservative governments implemented 
sweeping welfare reforms under the banner of austerity. Benefit 
uprating was limited to a 1% yearly increase between 2012–
2016. Since 2016 – with some exceptions such as ‘triple-locked’ 
state pension entitlements – benefits have been subject to a 
‘benefits freeze’, essentially cancelling the uprating of benefits 
in line with inflation33. Freezing enhancements resulted in the 
value of benefits being vulnerable to changes in the inflation 
rate.
Data presented in the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2020 
report38 on UK poverty highlights increases in inflation after a 
post-recession slump reduced the real value of benefits since 
2016 placing severe constraints on low-income household 
budgets. Figure 9 shows the real value of UK benefits fell 6% 
between 2013–201933. This loss of ‘real value’ essentially means 
a reduced capacity to afford the costs of living if the price of 
essential items - such as food - increase over time. As outlined 
below, food prices did increase significantly during the reces-
sion and subsequent recovery period, which feasibly could 
have contributed to increased vulnerability to food insecurity.
Child benefit payments have been subject to a longer uprat-
ing freeze, having been frozen between 2010–2014 and subse-
quently at 2015 rates until April 2020 (see Figure 10). Benefits 
to support families have been further impacted by the ‘two-child 
limit’ policy. The effects of this policy have been slow to mate-
rialise but by April 2020 the two-child limit policy affected 
911,000 children39. This policy affects in-work as well as 
out-of-work benefits, primarily impacting the unemployed 
and those in low-paid employment. Indeed, the majority of 
affected households in 2020 (57%) were classified as in-work39. 
These are unprecedented changes to support given to families 
in Europe. The two-child policy is predicted to have a growing 
impact on household poverty. Affected families could lose up to 
£2,780 per annum for every child beyond the second27. The pol-
icy also specifically reduces the income of larger households that 
are already more vulnerable to being in, or close to falling into, 
poverty. Considering children are already much more likely 
to experience poverty, such policies must be considered as 
potentially contributing to an increased risk of food insecurity.
Uprating of benefits restarted in April 2020 with benefits and 
tax credits linked to inflation rising by 1.7%. In response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, UC standard allowances and the Work-
ing Tax Credit basic element have also been increased by 
£20 a week until September 2021. Even with such temporary 
increases to benefits during the pandemic, out-of-work house-
holds are in receipt of less support in 2020 than in 2011 – 10% 
lower on average and 12% lower in workless households with 
children than it would have been in 2011 without any policy 
changes in the interim26. It remains to be seen whether such 
additional support is sufficient to protect low-income house-
holds, already feeling the impact of 4 years of reduced real 
value of benefits, from the economic impacts of COVID-19 and 
risk of food insecurity.
Benefit sanctions and conditionality
During the recent period of austerity and welfare reform it is 
not only the net amount of state support households receive 
that has been the focus of much debate in relation to food 
insecurity, restrictions in eligibility, increased conditionality and 
changes to the way benefits are administered have also come 
to the fore19. In 2018, the Trussell Trust reported that benefits 
were the most common form of income in 86% of referrals, and 
two-thirds of households referred to food bank provision had 
experienced problems with the benefit system in the last year19. 
Prime amongst the reported difficulties were delays during the 
switch from legacy benefits and employment to UC payments 
(the “five week wait”), the use of benefit sanctions stopping 
Table 1. Responses of workers (16+ years) on zero-hours 
contracts April to June 2020 (EMP17: Looking for more 
hours).
% of people 
on a zero-
hour contract
      Wants additional job 
      Wants replacement job with longer hours
4.3
3.6
      Wants more hours in current job 21.4
Total underemployed 29.2
      Does not want more hours 61.0
      Unknown status 9.7
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benefit payments for up to 182 days, failed Personal Independ-
ent Payment (PIP) assessments3, and introduction of the ‘bed-
room tax’4. Statistical modelling of Trussell Trust food bank 
usage over the years 2011/12 to 2018/19, controlling for the 
number of operating foodbanks, demonstrated these benefit 
related factors to be significant predictors of food bank parcel 
demand19. This shows UK welfare reforms and austerity 
measures introduced from the early 2010’s have significantly 
contributed to a rising risk of food insecurity – as indicated 
by food bank use – even when controlling for the growth 
in the number and availability of food banks as a potential 
driver. These findings relate to the operation of the UK 
largest food bank provider but still likely substantially under-
represents the true scale of food insecurity since not all of 
those experiencing food insecurity will: (i) access a Trussell 
Trust food bank, and (ii) seek food bank support6.
The use of sanctions is further reason to suspect that wel-
fare reform since 2010 has constricted household budgets and 
potentially reduced the capacity of households to afford ade-
quate food. The Welfare Reform Act 2012 laid the foundations 
of benefit sanctioning and conditionality that characterise the 
present social security system. Whilst policies such as benefit 
sanctioning were part of the benefit administration procedure 
prior to 2012, the severity and impact of sanctions increased 
from 2012. Figure 11 shows the total number of monthly 
JSA sanctions as a percentage of total number of claimants 
between 2000 and 2016. Whilst there were signs of increased 
sanction rates from 2007, the real rise in sanctioning fol-
lowed election of the Coalition government in 2010. Sanction 
levels continued to increase after the introduction of the Wel-
fare Reform Act 2012. This Act also amplified the impact of 
sanctions imposed from 2012 onwards by increasing the length 
and severity of the sanctions and the numbers of claimants sub-
ject to conditionality - and subsequent sanction - to higher 
levels than ever before40. At the peak of sanction referrals in 
2013, the Oakley Review of JSA sanction policies was under-
taken. The subsequent report broadly recommended better com-
munication of conditionality requirements and processes for 
claimants41. JSA sanction rates fell fairly consistently from 2013 
up to 2016. There is some debate regarding what caused the fall 
3DWP assessment of eligibility for disability related support (introduced 
in April 2013) replacing the Disability Living Allowance for adults 
assessment 
4The bedroom tax policy reduces housing benefit entitlement for those 
living in council or social housing with unoccupied bedrooms. Housing 
benefit is reduced 14% for 1, and 25% for 2 or more, spare bedrooms
Figure 9. The real value of benefits since and compared a base index value in 2013. Reproduced with permission from Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (2020). UK Poverty 2019/20. The leading independent report: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-poverty-2020-21.
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in JSA sanctions. The transfer of claimants to UC during the 
initial roll-out from 2013 onwards certainly accounts for 
much of the fall but there is also evidence of a reduction in the 
previously applied pressure on DWP staff to make sanction 
referrals from 2013 onwards42 (see cpag.org.uk/david-webster for 
a comprehensive overview and regular updates of sanction 
data).
Figure 12 shows the sanction rate and sanction length for both 
UC Live and Full service as reported between August 2015 – 
February 2020. Overall, the UC monthly sanction rate was 
reported to be falling from a peak of approximately 9% in 2017 to 
just over 2% at the beginning of 2020. Over the period of roll-
ing out UC the level of claimants subject to conditionality – 
therefore subject to facing sanction – has fallen from 81% in 
August 2015 to 60% in 202043. In total, 84% of UC sanctions 
lasted 13 weeks or less since August 2015 with a median length of 
29 days43. However, reporting of sanction data has been beset 
with methodological issues and corrections. Indeed, the DWP 
withdrew all data on the duration of UC sanctions in November 
2020 whilst the methodology is investigated44. This data has 
yet to be reinstated at the time of writing so the presented data 
on sanction length has to be treated as unconfirmed. The use of 
sanctions has continued in broadly the same manner for UC 
as for JSA. However, a number of key features of UC sanctions 
have increased the severity and impact of the penalty. Firstly, 
UC sanctions are longer since they can be issued to run con-
secutively rather than concurrently. Hardship funds available to 
support claimants during sanction periods have also become 
automatically repayable from future UC payments, effectively 
placing claimants in debt to the DWP. Hardship repayments 
taken from future UC benefits are set at the same rate at which 
the hardship repayment is lower than the benefit received (40%). 
This effectively results in the claimant being under sanction 
for 2.5 times longer than length of the original sanction whilst 
they repay the hardship debt45. There have also been changes 
to sanction procedures that specifically impacts demographic 
groups most at risk of food insecurity. For example, lone par-
ents with children would have previously lost 20% of ben-
efit entitlements under sanction. Under the UC regime lone 
parents with a child between 2 and 5 years lose 100%, and 
those with a child aged 1 year lose 40% of their standard 
allowance46. Individuals with a disability are also known to 
be more vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity19,47. Benefit 
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Figure 11. Adverse JSA benefit sanction decisions per month as a % of claimants, April 2001 – September 2016 (represents all 
sanctions imposed prior to subsequent appeals or reversals). Adapted and reproduced with permission from Webster, D. (2017). 
BRIEFING: Benefit Sanctions Statistics: JSA, ESA and Universal Credit. Feb. 2017: https://cpag.org.uk/david-webster.
Figure 12. A). Total UC claimants (Live and Full service) with a sanction deduction, as a proportion of UC claimants, August 2015 – February 
2020; B). UC (Live and Full service) sanctions completed by length of sanction (thousands), August 2015 – February 2020. Both data sets have 
been suspended subject to review. Data from Department of Work & Pensions (experimental statistics): https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistics/benefit-sanctions-statistics-to-january-2020-experimental/benefit-sanctions-statistics-to-january-2020.
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claimants with a disability have previously been shown to be 
more likely to be subject to sanction under legacy benefits48,49. 
However, it is not yet possible to ascertain the impact of UC 
sanctions on claimants with disabilities as the DWP does not 
publish sufficient data to permit this analysis.
In a parliamentary committee meeting on the effectiveness 
of sanction use in 2018, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
acknowledged that “sanctions by nature have to threaten some 
level of hardship. But this should not result in destitution”50. 
The imposition of sanctions must be considered a direct and 
immediate pathway to poverty, destitution and, by extension, 
food insecurity. The falling rates of sanctioning mask the increased 
severity of sanctions imposed and the longer-term effects 
on those that have faced them. The amount of all debt repay-
ment deductions reclaimed from UC entitlements increased 
from 7% (£9 million from £140 paid) in April 2017 to 10% 
(£39 million out of £410 million paid) in October 201851. In 
2020, the Trussell Trust reported that their food bank users were 
more frequently in debt to the government than friends and 
payday loan companies; 47% reported debt arrears to the DWP 
as a result of loans and benefit overpayments52. The legacy of the 
significant rise in sanctions enacted during 2010–2013 may also 
still be impacting households that were pushed into a cycle of 
debt. There is no doubt sanctioning has pushed the income 
of households already facing poverty below the official ben-
efit scale, i.e. households routinely receiving less income than 
that presumably considered to be the minimum required to pay 
for the costs of living. The withdrawal of all state benefits for 
weeks will inevitably push households into debt and reduce 
spending on essentials such as food. 
Restrictions to movement and social contact during the 
COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the suspension of new sanc-
tions from March 2020. Many lengthy existing sanctions were 
carried over the suspension with 12,643 claimants initially being 
reported as still under sanction by July 202053. The DWP has 
since significantly revised this Figure to 6,949 claimants in 
August 202054. There is still no evidence to demonstrate the use 
of sanctioning is efficacious in its aim of increasing the number of 
claimants seeking and finding employment or increased hours 
of employment. The DWP review of the effectiveness of sanc-
tions is two years overdue and statistics related to sanctions are 
lacking crucial detail and are routinely withdrawn and revised.
Housing costs
Housing costs may provide a good indication of the money 
available to households to spend on other essential living costs 
since they account for a significant proportion of a household’s 
expenditure. Poverty indicators are also higher when calcu-
lated AHC deductions reflecting that households at the lower 
end of the income distribution tend to spend a greater pro-
portion of their income on housing. This means low-income 
household budgets are more sensitive to the effects of fluc-
tuations in housing costs. A number of significant changes in 
UK housing over the last 20 years have had implications for 
low-income households. Firstly, the nature of UK housing 
tenure has drastically transformed with a significant shift to 
privately rented housing, particularly amongst young adults. 
This reflects shifts across the income distribution with significant 
drops in availability of social housing affecting households 
at the bottom, and falls in owner-occupation at the top, of the 
income distribution55. The UK social housing sector has been 
shrinking since the Right to Buy scheme was introduced in 
the 1980s with little attempt to replace lost social housing. 
Council-owned social housing stock declined from 30% in 1981 
to less than 8% by 201733. In 2018/19, it is estimated only 7% 
of social housing needed to meet the yearly demand of social 
rentals was completed56. These tenure shifts have resulted in a 
significant increase in households living in less secure and often 
more costly housing in the private sector. Indeed, the propor-
tion of households living in private rented accommodation has 
risen from 11% in 2005/6 to 19% in 2018/19 (see Figure 13 
for UK tenure trends 2005/6 – 2018/19). Private renting is 
the only tenure type to have shown consistent growth since 
2005.
There is evidence to suggest this shift in UK housing tenure 
may disproportionately affect low-income households. Bailey57 
cross tabulated data from the FRS with relative poverty data to 
identify the tenure status of households living 60% below the 
contemporary equivalised median income (AHC). This analy-
sis highlighted a significant shift to private renting in young 
adults under 40 living in relative poverty. Figure 14 shows the 
share of adults under 40 in relative poverty living in owner 
occupied, social rented, privately rented housing and those 
living care of/rent free – defined as adults within the house-
hold who are neither the householder nor the partner of the 
householder; typically adult offspring of the householder. Since 
2005 the proportion of young adults in relative poverty 
living in private rented housing has increased from 27% to 
42% resulting in more impoverished young adults living in 
privately rented housing than owner occupied and socially 
rented accommodation combined57. Bailey’s analysis also high-
lighted that 36% of children living in poverty live in privately 
rented accommodation.
The Joseph Rowntree UK poverty report 2020/21 highlights 
a combination of high housing costs in the private rented sec-
tor combined with falling levels of Housing Benefit provision 
have increased the vulnerability of low-income households 
to poverty38. This increased pressure on low-income house-
holds is not limited to private rentals. Figure 15 shows house-
holds spending more than one-third of their income (including 
Housing Benefit) on housing costs as a function of tenure. 
Renting privately is indeed associated with a higher likeli-
hood of spending over a third of income on housing. However, 
social housing has not been immune to rising housing costs 
with a growing proportion of households since 2011 spend-
ing over a third of their income on housing in this sector. There 
is evidence to suggest those most vulnerable to poverty, and 
subsequent food insecurity, are most vulnerable to the effects 
of high housing costs. Figure 16 shows the proportion of the 
UK working age adults that spend more than one-third of their 
income on housing costs (net of Housing Benefit) between 
2004/5 and 2016/17 separated into five income quintiles. 
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The Figure clearly shows the difference in proportion of 
income spent on housing costs across the income distribution. 
Housing costs have accounted for over one-third of income 
in nearly 40–50% of the poorest households over the last 15 
years. Households spending more than one-third of their income 
on housing costs has risen from 39% in 2004/5 to 47% in 
2017/18 in the poorest quintile whilst higher-income households 
have seen relatively no change during this period.
As the cost of housing accounts for a growing proportion 
of a household’s income it is inevitable cutbacks on other 
essentials – such as food quantity and quality – will be forced 
upon some of the worse affected households. This is likely 
to have intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic as many 
households faced a further 20% drop in income under the fur-
lough scheme and as a result of underemployment. Private 
renters in low-income households are likely to have faced 
significant economic impact since these households are over- 
represented in the economic sectors hardest hit (e.g. retail, 
entertainment, service industries)38. Whilst support and protec-
tions for private renters were introduced during the pandemic, 
many will have faced significant hardship and insecure hous-
ing. In the social housing sector, the pandemic increased the 
prevalence of rent arrears and reduced income for poorer house-
holds. A poll by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in October 
2020 found 37% of social renters reported having to cut down 
on food spending since the start of the pandemic; 8% having 
to specifically reduce food spending for children33.
The cost of food
Income available to a household to spend on essential items 
such as food is not the only indicator that needs to be consid-
ered when examining the potential conditions that may increase 
vulnerability to food insecurity. The price and affordability 
of food are also primary determinants of a household’s capac-
ity to access the food needed to maintain an adequate diet 
as well as influencing food choices58. Figure 17 shows the 
price of food and non-alcoholic beverage in real terms in the 
Figure 13. UK housing tenure trends between 2005/6 – 2018/19. Data from Family Resources Survey: https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/family-resources-survey--2.
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UK since 2005. Spikes in the price of agricultural commodi-
ties and oil since 2007 combined with high inflation contributed 
to a trend in rising food prices from 2009, reaching a peak in 
201459. These rising prices coincide with the period the UK 
faced the fallout of recession when household budgets in 
low-income households would have been reduced. Whilst food 
prices started to fall after 2014, they remain higher than those 
pre-2008.
To assess the impact of food prices on low-income house-
holds it is not sufficient to examine the price of food in isolation 
since it does not account for fluctuations in household budg-
ets. The share of household budget that is spent on food gives 
a clearer indication of the relative affordability of food. This 
is of particular importance to low-income households as they 
typically spend less per person but a greater proportion of their 
total income on food60. As a consequence, poorer households 
face a disproportionately greater impact of rising food costs. 
Figure 18 shows the proportion of household income spent on 
food and non-alcoholic drinks from 2003 to 2018 in all UK 
households and lowest 20% of households by equivalised 
income. The disparity in the amount of household budget 
expended on food is clear. As expected, an increased proportion 
of household income spent on food coinciding with food price 
increases between 2008–2014 is shown. However, the propor-
tion spent on food in the poorest 20% of households has since 
fallen below pre-2007 levels. In 2018/19 this still accounted 
for 14.7% of income in the poorest households compared 
to 10.5% in the UK as a whole. 
Figure 19 illustrates the pressures on income as a result of 
the unaffordability of food in the poorest households by plot-
ting AHC income in the lowest 5th percentile against real term 
food prices between 2002 and 2018. An overall food price 
increase of 3.5% between 2002–2018 coincided with a reduc-
tion in AHC income in the lowest income households of 12% 
Figure 14. Housing tenure status of adults < 40 living in relative poverty (AHC) 2005/6 – 2018/19. Adapted with permission from 
analyses by Bailey, N. (2020) https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.
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Figure 15. Proportion of UK working age adults paying more than 1/3 of income on housing costs by housing tenure type 2005/6 
– 2016/17. Data from DWP HBAI statistics: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/households-below-average-income-hbai--2.
Figure 16. Proportion of UK working age adults paying more than 1/3 of income on housing costs by income quintile 2004/5 
– 2016/17. Adapted with permission from Joseph Rowntree Foundation: https://www.jrf.org.uk/data/working-age-adults-spending-more-
third-income-housing-costs. Data from DWP HBAI statistics: https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/study?id=5828&type
=Data%20catalogue.
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during the same period59. Reduced affordability of food 
may increase the risk of food insecurity in terms of capac-
ity to buy enough food for some of the poorest households. 
It is this reduced capacity to access a sufficient quantity of food, 
and often associated recourse to food bank provision to fill 
this gap, that for many typifies the common perception of food 
insecurity. However, most definitions of food insecurity empha-
sise both quantity and quality of food. Reduced food afford-
ability is closely linked with food choice and the quality of 
food purchased58,61. Food insecurity is closely associated 
with a lower quality of diet, particularly a reduced intake of fruit, 
vegetables and dairy62. Reduced affordability of food is pro-
posed to shift food purchases in the poorest household towards 
cheaper more energy dense food choices63,64; that is, when 
household budgets are constrained by economic factors, poorer 
households may maximise energy value for money60. Closer 
analysis of rising UK food prices since 2002 has shown that cost 
rises have been greater for healthier vs. less healthy foods types 
(indexed by a UK Food Standards Agency nutrient profiling 
model)65. Analysis by the Food Foundation further demon-
strated social inequity in the affordability of a healthier diet by 
comparing the cost of purchasing a diet of sufficient quality 
to meet the UK Government’s Eat Well Guide to household 
expenditure and disposable income data from the 2015/16 Living 
Cost and Food Survey and Family Resources Survey66. A 
total of 26% of UK households, over half of which contained 
at least one child, would be required to spend over a quarter of 
disposable income AHC to meet the Eat Well Guide costs. 
Households with children in the lowest two income deciles (annual 
earnings <£15,860) would need to spend 42% AHC disposable 
income to meet the recommended dietary quality requirements66.
Evidence of poor income growth in the poorest households 
since 2013, rising food costs, and the affordability of health-
ier diets are likely to contribute to social inequalities in health 
by affecting the secure access to quality diets in the poorest 
households. For example, a shift to cheaper, energy dense, often 
nutrient poor, food choices has been proposed to account to 
some degree for the increased levels of overweight and obes-
ity observed in low socioeconomic status groups, particularly 
women67–69. However, the association between food insecu-
rity and obesity in the UK is yet to be clearly characterised70 
and much of this data is representative of the US food insecure 
population.
Figure 17. Monthly UK food and non-alcoholic beverage prices in real terms (adjusted for inflation in line with the Consumer 
Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH), January 2005 to March 2020. Adapted from DEFRA: https://www.gov.
uk/government/statistics/food-statistics-pocketbook/food-statistics-in-your-pocket-prices-and-expenditure.
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Health indicators associated with poor nutritional 
quality
Having focussed upon data that give an indication of economic 
conditions that may have promoted food insecurity over time, 
we now turn to data related to the potential consequences of 
food insecurity one would expect to see if individuals were 
unable to secure adequate nutritional intake. This includes direct 
measures such as the prevalence of malnutrition in the popula-
tion, and indirect indicators of poor nutritional intake such as 
nutrition-related disease. Clearly, such markers are influenced by 
a complex array of variables and will not provide any accurate 
indication of the prevalence of food insecurity as such, but any 
significant movements in such markers over time, especially if 
they coincide with previously outlined economic trends, may 
permit a degree of insight into the potential prevalence of food 
insecurity.
Malnutrition 
Malnutrition refers to a state in which an imbalance of 
energy and nutrients results in measurable adverse effects on 
tissue, body shape, size and composition, and/or function. 
Malnutrition can be a result of undernutrition and overnutri-
tion (obesity) – the double burden of malnutrition. An indi-
vidual can be underweight or overweight and be malnourished 
if their diet lacks the nutrients required to maintain healthy 
function. In 2018, the UK Stakeholders for Sustainable 
Development (UKSSD), a cross-sector network campaigning 
for action to meet UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
reported that the UK was struggling to address malnutrition 
in all its forms. The report considered socioeconomic status 
a key driver in the failings to provide healthy, sustainable, 
diverse diets for the UK population71. This coincided with 
the NHS reporting a resurgence in so-called ‘Victorian Dis-
eases’ which were prevalent during historical periods of 
severe poverty in the mid-to-late 19th Century. This includes 
undernourishment, scurvy and rickets - diseases associated 
with an impoverished diet. Malnutrition is commonly used 
to refer only to undernutrition. In this section, malnutrition 
will be employed to denote undernutrition, and overweight 
and obesity to denote overnutrition.
Figure 18. Proportion of household spend on food and non-alcoholic drink 2005/06 – 2018/19 in all UK households and lowest 
20% of households by equivalised income. Data from Living Costs and Food Survey (Defra/ONS), Family Spending table 3.1e (ONS) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/food-statistics-pocketbook/food-statistics-in-your-pocket-prices-and-expenditure.
Page 21 of 34
Emerald Open Research 2021, 3:16 Last updated: 09 AUG 2021
Malnutrition is commonly defined as a BMI <18.5 kg/m2, 
>10% unintentional weight loss in the last 3–6 months, or a 
BMI <20 kg/m2 and >5% unintentional weight loss within the last 
3– 6 months72. There is no single, robust measure of the preva-
lence of malnutrition in the UK population. An often cited esti-
mate of malnutrition is taken from the British Association for 
Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition (BAPEN) who report 3 million 
people, 1.3 million of which are over 65 years, of the UK pop-
ulation are malnourished73. However, this estimate relates 
to data from 2005–2011 only and appears not to have been 
updated since. The only longitudinal data directly measur-
ing malnutrition comes in the form of reported deaths and 
hospital admission data. Figure 20 shows the number of reported 
deaths in England as a result of malnutrition or for which mal-
nutrition was mentioned in the death certificate since 2005. 
This data refers to undernutrition or starvation as defined by 
WHO ICD-1074. The number of deaths for which malnutrition 
was an underlying cause or mentioned as an underlying 
cause or contributory factor nearly doubled between 2005 and 
2017. However, there are many reasons an individual may be 
undernourished, particularly as a direct result of ill health, so 
it is inappropriate to automatically assume undernourishment 
to be a consequence of deprivation.
Malnourished adults account for a significant proportion of hos-
pital admissions, particularly from care homes75. Figure 21 
shows the number of UK hospital finished admission episodes 
registered as having a primary or primary or secondary diagno-
sis of malnutrition between 2007 and 2018. Admissions with 
a primary diagnosis of malnutrition more than doubled dur-
ing this period; admissions with a primary or secondary diag-
nosis almost quadrupled. A diagnosis of ICD-10 code of 
Figure 19. UK lowest 5th percentile household income (after housing costs) and food prices in real terms 2002 - 2018. Adapted 
from DEFRA: Food Statistics in your pocket: Prices and expenditure: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/food-statistics-pocketbook/
food-statistics-in-your-pocket-prices-and-expenditure.
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malnutrition indicates the patient was diagnosed and received 
treatment for malnutrition during the hospital stay. The 
cause of malnutrition is not recorded. Therefore, it is not 
possible to disentangle those admitted to hospital with an 
underlying medical condition for which malnutrition is an 
associated comorbidity, from those experiencing undernutrition 
due to some other factor such as poverty or reduced social 
provision. However, an increase of this magnitude cannot be 
accounted for by malnutrition secondary to a medical condi-
tion alone; additional factors must account for a proportion 
of the increase in malnutrition cases.
Older adults are often most at risk from malnutrition, with evi-
dence of inadequate dietary intake both in older adults living in 
the community and in social care73. Previously outlined data 
shows that older adults in the UK have experienced significant 
improvements in poverty levels and were largely protected 
from the recession in terms of income protection. This would 
suggest a level of protection from food insecurity. However, 
adults over 60 years have accounted for more than 50% of 
hospital admissions with a primary or secondary diagnosis of 
malnutrition between 2007 and 2017 (see Figure 22). A rise 
from ~50% of admissions in 2007 (for cases in which the age 
of patients was known) to 60% in 2017 has been recorded in 
those over 60 years. This Figure may also underestimate the 
extent of the problem since common admissions for falls or 
accidents in older adults may be as a direct consequence of the 
effects of malnutrition which may not be diagnosed or recorded. 
Figure 20. Number of deaths for which malnutrition was (a) the underlying cause of death, or (b) mentioned anywhere 
on the death certificate as underlying cause or contributory factor, persons, England, deaths registered between 
2005 – 2017. Data from: ONS 2018: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/
deaths/adhocs/009065deathswheremalnutritionwastheunderlyingcauseofdeathorwasmentionedanywhereonthedeathcert
ificatepersonsenglandandwales2001to2017.
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This level of malnutrition in a section of the population is sug-
gestive of an issue with access to food that has increased over 
time in spite of improvements to the economic status of older 
adults. Whilst the economic situation of the average pension age 
adult may have improved dramatically since the 1990s, it has 
been fairly static since with approximately 15–20% of pen-
sion age adults having been in relative poverty since 2005 (see 
Figure 6). Welfare spending cuts during austerity are also 
likely to have impacted the level of social care service provi-
sion for older adults to help protect them from insecure access 
to food. This was highlighted by a review of ‘meals on wheels’ 
provision across the UK by Association for Public Service 
Excellence (APSE) in 201876. Table 2 shows the proportion of 
UK Local Authorities offering meals on wheels service 
(directly or by external contract) in 2014, 2016 and 2018. Pro-
vision across the UK fell from 66% in 2014 to 42% in 2018. 
Provision for older adults in the North East and North West, 
two regions most acutely affected by food insecurity, was 
only 17% and 13%, respectively, in 2018. Such evidence of 
reduced care provision for older adults at home is particularly 
concerning since the vast majority of malnourished older 
adults live in the community73.
Potential causes of malnutrition in older adults are complex 
and should not be considered only as a potential direct result of 
reduced access to food due to individual economic circum-
stances. Indeed, as previously outlined, the first FRS food 
insecurity module for 2019/20 reported comparatively low food 
insecurity in older adult groups2. Social isolation, loneliness, 
bereavement, loss of appetite, impaired cognitive or physical 
capacity and mobility issues affecting access to shops have 
all been associated with reduced food intake in older adult 
populations77,78. Whilst the recent FRS survey shows older 
adults are comparatively less likely to report being food 
insecure than younger cohorts, many are more likely to be 
vulnerable to reductions in levels of social care provision 
impacting their access to a sufficiently nutritious diet. Adult 
social care includes a broad range of non-medical services 
for individuals that need support with activities of daily living 
such as washing, feeding, housework or general mobility. This 
Figure 21. UK hospital Finished Admission Episodes (FAEs) with i) a primary diagnosis & ii) a primary or secondary diagnosis 
of malnutrition, England, May 2007 - April 2008 to May 2018 - April 2019. Data from: NHS Digital: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-information/2019-supplementary-information-files/victorian-diseases---hospital-
admissions.
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includes the provision of, and/or support to, shop, cook and eat, 
nutritionally balanced meals. Social care funded in-home sup-
port or lunch clubs also provide a source of essential social 
contact which can mitigate the negative effects of loneliness 
and social isolation on appetite and dietary intake79. Austerity 
measures between 2010 and 2018 have resulted in an 18% 
reduction (in real terms) of total revenues available to local 
authorities that are responsible for the commissioning of social 
care provision80. An investigation by IFS reported that the aus-
terity programme precipitated an 18.9% fall in social care 
spending on the over 65s between 2009/10 and 2017/18. When 
accounting for a 19.3% population growth in adults over 
65 years during this period, this translates to a 31.2% reduction 
in mean per-person social care spending in England for those 
over 65 years81. These cuts to social care provision had direct 
effects on the health and well-being of older adults. Crawford 
et al.’s analyses estimates that between 2009/10 and 2017/18 
social care cuts accounted for between a quarter and half of 
a 33% increase in annual A&E visits by older adults over 
65 years81. These negative effects were felt most by the oldest 
and those living in the most deprived neighbourhoods. There 
is little indication that circumstances will improve considering 
Figure 22. UK hospital Finished Admission Episodes (FAEs) with i) a primary diagnosis & ii) a primary or secondary diagnosis of 
malnutrition, May 2007 - April 2008 to May 2017 - April 2018 by age group. Data from: NHS Digital: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-information/2019-supplementary-information-files/victorian-diseases---hospital-
admissions.
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a National Audit Office enquiry recently reported that 94% of 
councils in England with social care responsibilities expect to 
reduce social care budgets further in 2021/2282.
The full impact of COVID-19 and subsequent social restric-
tions and economic impacts on the levels of malnutrition in the 
UK is yet to be fully shown. However, it is clear older people 
face a significantly higher risk compared to the rest of the 
population both in terms of vulnerability to COVID-19 itself, 
and the effects of social distancing. Many older adults will 
have experienced significant social isolation during the pan-
demic. This increases the risk of insecure access to food and 
malnutrition as a consequence of increased difficulty access-
ing an adequate quantity and quality of food, and potential 
reduced appetite as a result of impoverished social contact83. 
Poor nutritional status is associated with reduced immune func-
tion and greater risk of communicable disease84 and may sub-
sequently increase the susceptibility, and reduce the recovery 
potential, of older adults.
Figure 22 illustrates that the increase in UK hospital admis-
sion rates for which malnutrition was recorded as a primary or 
secondary diagnosis was not limited to older adults. Malnutri-
tion diagnoses across all age groups has increased markedly 
since 2007. These increases have been more consistently pro-
nounced in those over 60 years, however, malnutrition more 
than doubled in the 50–59 and 20–29 age ranges – 211% 
and 263%, respectively. Increased awareness and improved 
screening of malnutrition in hospitals may account for some 
of the rise in reported admission cases. However, such a rise in 
reported malnutrition in younger age ranges is suggestive of a 
worrying trend. It is not possible to interpret the increased 
incidence of malnutrition in younger age groups as indicative of 
an increased prevalence of food insecurity, but it is suggestive 
of rising poor nutritional status in sectors of the population 
that are not typically malnourished in significant numbers. 
This is supported by evidence of a growing number of reported 
cases of ‘legacy’ diseases associated with poor nutrition. 
Figure 23 shows the number of hospital admission episodes 
with a primary and/or secondary diagnosis of scurvy or rickets 
between 2007 and 2018. Reported cases of scurvy have 
increased fairly steadily since 2008 with a marked spike in 
2017; rickets cases spiked in 2011–12. Both scurvy and rick-
ets have long been considered relics of the past in which 
impoverished sections of the population consumed inadequate 
diets. These spikes in reported cases, coinciding with the 
UK economic downturn, have been suggested to reflect a 
reduction in the quality of life of the poorest85, but it is not 
possible to establish the role, if any, food insecurity may 
have played in these disease trends. However, there is evi-
dence to suggest poverty, which can be considered a close cor-
relate of food insecurity, has played a key role in inequitable 
dietary related outcomes. For example, dental health can 
be considered a proxy indicator of diet quality. The dental 
health of children in the UK has shown steady improvement 
since 2007 (see Figure 24); however, dental decay preva-
lence is clearly related to economic position with worse dental 
health evident the lower children fall on the socioeconomic 
Table 2. Percentage of UK Local Authorities offering ‘Meals on 
Wheels’ Service (directly or by external contract).
Country Region 2014 2016 2018
England East of England 64% 64% 45%
East Midlands 88% 50% 50%
London 69% 59% 41%
North East 25% 25% 17%
North West 48% 17% 13%
South East 67% 33% 39%
South West 71% 53% 41%
West Midlands 60% 53% 47%
Yorkshire & Humber 50% 44% 20%
Northern Ireland 100% 100% 80%
Scotland 94% 75% 61%
Wales 59% 50% 45%
UK 66% 48% 42%
Taken from the Association for Public Service Excellence (APSE) report.
Available: https://www.publicsectorcatering.co.uk/sites/default/files/
attachment/nacc_-_meals_on_wheels_report_2018.pdf
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gradient. In a high income country with an advanced econ-
omy and health care system, the existence of malnutrition 
and dietary related disease associated with poverty has to be 
considered a significant failure of public health policy.
Food insecurity and overweight and obesity
The relationship between food insecurity and undernutrition 
seems intuitively plausible. Paradoxically, food insecurity is 
also associated with obesity and weight gain. Evidence from 
the USA has long demonstrated an association between inse-
cure access to food and obesity and weight gain, particularly 
in women with children (e.g. 67–70). There is also a grow-
ing literature demonstrating this relationship in American 
children, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally86,87. In 
the absence of a longitudinal measure of food insecurity, it 
is not possible to directly examine the relationship between 
food insecurity and overweight and obesity status in the 
UK. However, existing data shows a clear relationship between 
socio-economic status and weight. Taking children as an 
example, Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the prevalence of over-
weight and obesity by income deciles in English children 
aged 4–5 and 10–11, respectively, between 2006 and 2018. 
Overweight and obesity rates in 4–5 year olds in England 
have been fairly consistent across time aside from some 
fluctuations about the median and a reduction in the least 
deprived. However, there is a clear gradient of incidence 
between the income deciles with greater prevalence in poorer 
children. The contrast across income groups in 10–11 year 
olds is even starker. Overweight and obesity prevalence in 
the most deprived deciles has been increasing at a fairly 
steady rate since 2006. Conversely, rates in the least deprived 
children show a levelling off and reduction in prevalence 
from 2011.
It is important to consider that the relationship between 
nutrition and weight gain and obesity is complex and influ-
enced by multiple factors beyond food availability and access. 
Further, the potential determinants of the relationship between 
food insecurity and weight are not fully elucidated70. Proposed 
mediators include the tendency for the cheapest food to be the 
most energy dense, least nutritious and especially palatable to 
children63,88. Food insecurity is also likely to cause stress 
and anxiety which are known to impact food choice, eating 
patterns and energy metabolism89. Whilst there is evidence 
of a link between weight and food insecurity, overweight and 
obesity status cannot be employed to estimate food insecurity 
prevalence. Measures of household food insecurity cap-
ture data during a specific period of time at a household level, 
whilst nutritional outcomes, such as weight, are the results of 
the long-term nutritional experience of the individual90. 
However, longitudinal data shows a clear pattern of inequality 
in overweight and obesity prevalence in the UK children; 
Figure 23. UK hospital Finished Admission Episodes (FAEs) with i) a primary diagnosis & ii) a primary or secondary diagnosis 
of A) Scurvy, and B) Rickets, May 2007 - April 2008 to May 2018 - April 2019. Data from: NHS Digital: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-information/2019-supplementary-information-files/victorian-diseases---hospital-
admissions.
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this is also evident in the UK adult population91. Understand-
ing the causes of these inequalities requires the careful meas-
urement of food insecurity at the individual level in adults 
and children to permit the development of targeted public 
health interventions. The impact of the pandemic is likely to 
have heightened the need for action considering recent evi-
dence that unhealthy food consumption increased, and fruit 
and vegetable intake decreased, during the first UK lock-
down of 2020; this effect was heightened amongst poorer 
children92.
Discussion
Prior to the inclusion of the food insecurity module in the 
2019/20 FRS, routine collection of large scale data on the 
prevalence of food insecurity in the UK was severely limited. The 
2003–2005 FSA Low Income Diet and Nutrition Survey and 
the Adult Food Security Module of the Food and You Survey, 
introduced in 2016, are the only other standardised national 
surveys that have measured the prevalence of food insecu-
rity at a UK population level. As a consequence, quantitative 
estimates of food insecurity since 2005 have largely relied on 
a patchwork of data collected by third sector organisa-
tions, alongside cohort studies of maternal populations18,93. 
This evidence, combined with the rich and detailed qualita-
tive first-hand accounts of those living under the spectre of 
food insecurity, have provided an invaluable, but crucially 
incomplete, insight into the prevalence of food insecurity 
in the UK.
Figure 24. Percentage of 5 year olds with experience of visually obvious dental decay in England by Deprivation Decile 2007 
– 2019. Data from: Public Health England Public Health Profiles: https://fingertips.phe.org.uk/.
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Taking the most frequently adopted data source of food bank 
usage exemplifies this. The experience of food bank users can 
provide an important insight into some of the drivers, and there-
fore potential proxy indicators, of food insecurity. Food bank 
data is also uniquely useful as it has been reported longitudinally 
since food bank networks and usage started to increase 
circa 2005. Despite issues with the granularity of food bank 
statistics - e.g. identifying unique users - the data certainly sug-
gests that the prevalence of food insecurity in the UK has 
increased significantly since 2005. This increase coincided with 
wider economic factors, such as austerity measures and social 
security reform. Indeed, despite Lord Freud’s assertion in the 
2013 House of Lords’ food bank debate that ‘food from a food 
bank – the supply – is a free good, and by definition there is an 
almost infinite demand’94, UK social security policies such as 
the UC rollout, benefit sanctions, and disability benefit reform, 
have been confirmed as drivers of food bank usage19.
However, food bank data can give only an incomplete 
measure of the prevalence of food insecurity. Measurement scales 
of food insecurity commonly differentiate between the severi-
ties of food insecurity faced. For example, the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation’s Food Insecurity Experience Scale 
(FIES) rates the experiential severity of food insecurity on a 
spectrum from mild – uncertainty about one’s ability to obtain 
food, to moderate – compromising on the quality/variety of 
food and reducing quantity of food eaten, through to severe food 
insecurity – no food for a day or more95. Those that access 
food bank provision are likely to fall towards the severe end of 
the scale – a significant proportion of food bank users report 
Figure 25. Prevalence of overweight (inc. obesity) in 4–5 year olds in England by Deprivation Deciles 2006 – 2018 (to aid clarity, 
only 3rd highest and lowest deciles shown). Data from: Public Health England Public Health Profiles: https://fingertips.phe.org.uk/.
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being destitute19– and therefore can be considered a non- 
representative subset of the food insecure population22. Worry 
over capacity to reliably obtain food and compromising on the 
quality of food consumed are associated with profound negative 
effects on mental and physical health10–12. It is essential that the 
number of individuals and households experiencing this mild 
to moderate level of food insecurity are accounted for in any 
measure of food insecurity prevalence. It is also evident 
that the majority of those in need may not access food bank 
provision23 and will therefore remain unacknowledged.
Can wider economic indicators be used to approximate the 
potential prevalence of food insecurity across the full experien-
tial scale of severity? Poverty and associated economic markers 
can at least be considered indicative of a landscape in which 
there is an increased risk of food insecurity for many in a popu-
lation. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation considers trends 
in poverty to be driven primarily by four factors: earnings, 
employment rate, housing costs, and benefits33. Since 2005, 
there has been a lack of a sustained period during which all 
four drivers were positively trending in a direction that would 
protect living standards as the UK faced a period of relatively 
poor growth by historical standards.
Significant economic shocks in the form of the recession, 
Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic profoundly negatively 
affected the economic landscape in the UK. However, the impact 
of these economic shocks and the poor growth and stagna-
tion shown in many economic markers have not been equitably 
distributed across the population.
Figure 26. Prevalence of overweight (inc. obesity) in 10–11 year olds in England by Deprivation Deciles 2006 - 2018 (to aid clarity, 
only 3rd highest and lowest deciles shown). Data from: Public Health England Public Health Profiles: https://fingertips.phe.org.uk/.
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Increases in living standards have been particularly stagnant 
amongst the poorest households with those in the lowest 10th 
percentile seeing little increase in income for over eight years, 
largely as a result of a fall in the real value of working-age 
benefits and tax credits offsetting employment gains. This 
inequity is mirrored in direct measures of poverty. Despite a 
fairly stable overall population poverty rate of ~22% since 2005, 
relative child poverty has been rising since 2011. This appar-
ent stability also masks a deepening of poverty for those in 
the lowest 10th percentile of income living below the poverty 
line. Nevertheless, overall, poverty trends only give a general 
impression of the economic position of a proportion of the 
population, and without a longitudinal direct measure of food 
insecurity it is difficult to determine the prevalence of and changes 
in food insecurity itself. There is no agreed level of poverty 
that can be used as a yardstick by which to classify households 
as vulnerable to, or likely to be experiencing, food insecurity. 
Further, data from the US shows that poverty and food insecu-
rity are not always corollary9. However, a high proportion of 
households most at risk of food insecurity are likely located 
at the extreme end of the poverty distribution, including 
within this 10% percentile that have experienced a worsening 
economic position over recent years.
One would expect the prevalence or risk of food insecurity to 
fall as UK employment rates have increased. However, in-work 
poverty and a growing number of, particularly young, adults 
working in precarious employment has risen since the reces-
sion. Significant changes in housing tenure and housing costs 
have also disproportionately affected low income households, 
and younger adults in particular. Poorer households spend more 
of their income on housing and this disparity has been 
increasing since 2007/0829. A scarcity of social housing stock 
and rising cost of homeownership have shifted housing tenure 
away from relatively secure social housing and towards private 
rental. Living in less secure, privately rented accommodation 
now outstrips homeownership and socially rented accommoda-
tion combined in adults under 40 living in relative poverty57. 
Whilst private rental accommodation is more expensive, the 
cost of social housing has also increased resulting in a grow-
ing proportion of poorer households spending over a third of 
their income on housing.
Poorer households typically also spend a greater proportion 
of their total income on food and have subsequently been dis-
proportionately affected by fluctuations in food costs over 
recent years. Income stagnation in the lowest income house-
holds in the wake of the recession coincided with rising food 
costs to reduce the affordability of food. This is likely to have 
had direct consequences for the dietary choices for poorer 
households. Reductions in quantity and quality of food are 
both central to definitions of food insecurity. Since food is 
often the only flexible item in a household budget, fluctuations 
in the cost of food, increased housing costs and reduced income 
will likely have reduced the amount and/or quality of food 
the poorest households could afford. Beyond local level analy-
ses (see 96), it is not possible to establish a causal link between 
food affordability, diet quality and food insecurity due the 
paucity of food insecurity data. Data on overweight and obes-
ity levels from the poorest households and re-emergence of 
nutrition-related diseases is certainly indicative of a reduced 
quality of diet. Similarly, a worrying growth in malnutrition 
in younger population groups also suggests a reduction in the 
quantity and quality of diet. However, in the absence of lon-
gitudinal food insecurity data collection, it is not possible to 
establish what part, if any, food insecurity plays in these 
trends. What is clear, however, is that socio-economic inequity 
plays a key role in diet quality and nutrition-related outcomes.
Changes in the UK economic landscape during and after the 
recession, accompanied by rising living costs, have put extra 
strain on low income households, potentially increasing the 
likelihood of poverty and food insecurity. However, these events 
have been exacerbated for many households by the welfare 
reform policies since 2010. Evidence suggests that welfare 
reforms and austerity measures are a prime proxy indicator for 
increasing food insecurity since 2005. In 2018, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission concluded that UK tax and 
welfare reforms since 2010 have disproportionately impacted the 
poorest households97. The retraction of the welfare state under 
the banner of ‘austerity’ effectively shrank the social security 
safety net, increasing poverty among low income households. The 
effects of welfare diversification, public spending cuts, ben-
efit conditionality and benefit freezes, and a reduced real value 
of benefits have combined to reduce the incomes of those 
households already below and close to the poverty line – the 
unemployed or unable to work, the underemployed, those work-
ing on low paid or precarious contracts, those requiring dis-
ability support, households containing children – at a time of 
existing economic hardship, increasing vulnerability to food 
insecurity in those known to be disproportionately at risk2. 
There is certainly evidence to indicate that social security and 
welfare policies have directly increased severe food insecu-
rity, as represented by food bank usage98. It is not known what 
effects these profound social policy changes have had on the 
prevalence of mild to moderate food insecurity; as we have 
seen these are often hidden and harder to quantify without a 
direct measure of food insecurity. Reduced social care provision 
during austerity may have contributed to a growing level of mal-
nutrition in older adults. However, the determinants of mal-
nutrition are multiple, complex and difficult to disentangle. 
The inaugural food insecurity module of the 2019/20 FRS 
suggests comparatively low household levels of food insecu-
rity in those over 65 years. However, overall food insecurity 
prevalence varied considerably as a function of household com-
position and tenure, geographical location, disability status, 
education level, ethnicity and income, indicating an as yet 
unexplored interaction of social and economic determinants.
Ultimately, the use of proxy indicators to estimate the longi-
tudinal prevalence of food insecurity is necessitated by a lack 
of formalised measurement. It is clear that food bank data, 
wider economic and social welfare provision markers, and 
nutrition-related health outcomes are not sufficient to give any 
comprehensive or clear indication of food security prevalence. 
However, it is possible to speculate that food insecurity has 
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increased since the early 21st century, at least towards the most 
severe end of the food insecurity scale as indexed by food 
bank data. It is also clear that a combination of economic and 
socio-political factors over the last 15 to 20 years, particularly 
post-recession, have created conditions in which the risk of 
food insecurity is likely to have increased for the poorest 
and most vulnerable UK households. The available data also 
strikingly illustrates the difficulty of accounting for the full 
spectrum of food insecurity experience in the absence of a 
direct measure. It is particularly difficult to account for and 
measure the experience of mild to moderate food insecurity 
since many proxy markers and outcomes tend to be more closely 
associated with severe food insecurity. Food bank and income-
based data give very little insight into the number of house-
holds or individuals that may regularly face worry or anxiety 
about securing sufficient quantities of food.
The societal impacts of food insecurity are too great to rely 
on approximation. Proxy data is not sufficiently robust or 
defined to be utilised to lever policy change to protect those 
vulnerable to or facing food insecurity. The inclusion of the 
USDA Food Security Measurement Module in the FRS ensures 
the standardised measurement and monitoring of food insecu-
rity in the UK going forward. This will permit a clear measure-
ment of the prevalence and those at risk of food insecurity, 
how it changes longitudinally and in relation to interventions 
and national policy, and the role it plays in negative social and 
health outcomes.
The adoption of the USDA Food Security Measurement 
Module should not be considered a perfect solution to a lack of 
food insecurity data in the UK. Firstly, the timeframe adopted 
only accounts for the last 30 days, rather than the commonly 
administered 12 months, which has been shown to under-
estimate food insecurity levels99. Second, this measure only 
accounts for food insecurity at the household level without 
specific reference to potential variability in food insecurity 
within households. For example, the items in the measure refer 
only to adults meaning no accurate indication of the level of 
food insecurity in children will be available. Moreover, the 
collection of quantitative data does not always naturally 
lead to action; there needs to be political will and public pres-
sure to enact necessary interventions. It can also be argued that 
there is already sufficient evidence to show food insecurity 
in the UK is a problem for a sizable proportion of the popu-
lation. Therefore, the focus of efforts should be to target 
resources on addressing the issue rather than delay response to 
permit standardised measurement. Further, targeting food 
insecurity in isolation may result in food-based only solutions 
(e.g. food charity, redistribution of surplus food) and neglect 
of the wider overarching societal and economic problems, par-
ticularly the government’s response to alleviate poverty and the 
causes of poverty.
Conclusion
Our analysis of proxy measures suggests an increase in 
food insecurity since 2005 in the UK, particularly in levels of 
severe food insecurity. Proxy measures are, however, inadequate 
to robustly assess the character and prevalence of food inse-
curity. The recent inclusion of food insecurity measurement 
in the FRS is welcome and should be continued. However, the 
historical absence of longitudinal data on UK household food 
insecurity means it is impossible to accurately ascertain the 
extent to which food insecurity has increased since 2005 and 
particularly since the introduction of ‘austerity’ in 2010. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated food insecurity 
among vulnerable groups and led to newly food insecure 
populations100, suggesting that changes to government social 
policy may now be needed urgently to reduce food insecurity 
among the UK population.
Data availability
Underlying data
Sources of all data underlying the results are given as part 
of the article and no additional source data are required.
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